Clever Beast

To the Atheists and Positivists

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 ”A frog in a well cannot conceive of the ocean.”

- Chuang Tzu 

Faith in something beyond science is to believe pragmatically that the frog cannot conceive of the ocean.  He cannot reasonably know whether there is something or nothing, the binary of science is unable to parse.  Reality is not a sliding scale, the world is not a clock.  I believe it is wiser to acknowledge the limitations of science, its enclosure from that which it cannot conceive.  Else it becomes the abyss you gaze into, far more seductive than any biblical parable. 

I believe in our ignorance.  This opens a world of possibilities for self-configuring, for aesthetics, for meaning.  It is all talk until you feel yourself on the brink of actual suffering and you long for a solace beyond the angles of reason.  You can call it whatever you want from the outside, when you are sober and still, but it is not the same thing from the inside - this is a fallacy, a linguistic confusion.  When you feel it, it is different (I hate to use a word burdened with religious connotation but it is as if it transfigures). Nor does it need to be framed and adored, just felt and acknowledged: an atomic conceit, a moment of something in defiance was here.  

“The general fact is simple. Poetry is sane because it floats easily in an infinite sea; reason seeks to cross the infinite sea, and so make it finite. The result is mental exhaustion, like the physical exhaustion of Mr. Holbein. To accept everything is an exercise, to understand everything a strain. The poet only desires exaltation and expansion, a world to stretch himself in. The poet only asks to get his head into the heavens. It is the logician who seeks to get the heavens into his head. And it is his head that splits.”

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G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (via invisibleforeigner)

(via novelcombinationofwords)

“The truth is that in the metaphysical and religious sphere, articulate reasons are cogent for us only when our inarticulate feelings of reality have already been impressed in favor of the same conclusion. Then, indeed, our intuitions and our reason work together, and great world-ruling systems, like that of the Buddhist or of the Catholic philosophy, may grow up. Our impulsive belief is here always what sets up the original body of truth, and our articulately verbalized philosophy is but its showy translation into formulas. The unreasoned and immediate assurance is the deep thing in us, the reasoned argument is but a surface exhibition. Instinct leads, intelligence does but follow. If a person feels the presence of a living God after the fashion shown by my quotations, your critical arguments, be they never so superior, will vainly set themselves to change his faith.”

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William James - The Varieties of Religious Experiences 

The Doctrine of Free Belief

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Belief precedes essence by default of man’s epistemological condition; insofar as we know the truth of something we are asserting a belief. For the sake of my present purposes I will call this meta-belief the ‘doctrine of free-belief’. The doctrine of free-belief is rationally irrefutable, or at least irrefutable to a form of logic that is uninhibited. Of course with provisional logic, like that used in mathematics and science, most anything can be refuted nominally within a provisionary bubble safe from real scrutiny. Philosophically speaking, DFB remains rationally irrefutable.


To the extent we need to speak of these concepts logically, doublethink is the application of the paradoxical inherent in the doctrine of free-belief, where surpassing the authority of logic itself a plurality of belief-systems can co-exist in an individual without error or discomfort. The key point of this is that we do not need to think of these things logically, and therefore the capacity for doublethink is not genuinely paradoxical, but is rather the inevitable result of the human condition.


This said however, by extension of the ‘doctrine of free-belief’ the individual is able to compartmentalize beliefs and work within self-consistent belief-systems in order to derive regulated doctrines which are socially transferable. i.e. Euclidean geometry can be socially supported and its applications independently verified, but its value is forever dependent on personal faith in its rationally indefensible first axioms.


Due to the emphasis on concerted effort in managing self-consistent belief-systems these acts depend on abstract thought. That is to say they are limiting of man’s capacities for belief so to impose order, which is an abstraction of the potentialities inherent in the doctrine of free-belief. Thus abstract thought cannot definitively explain the happenings of the mind, because it is provisional, although it can have the appearance of objectivity through personal faith, but belief is individual, and insofar as it is objective in this respect it remains individualistic when demanding others to agree also.


Logic is a meta-belief contingent to the doctrine of free-belief (the meta-meta-belief). Any number of threads can be conceived from this origin source, even threads which in their believed existence deny the existence of DFB, hence the rise of ideologies and potential fanaticism. Rationally articulated ideologies can be undermined by playing out their logical dependence to DFB

Reason: Concept or Essence?

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I have used the concepts ‘reason’ and ‘faith’ before and for the most part I have tried to keep their use confined to the realm of a thought experiment, because I believe they do not directly relate to the activities underlying these concepts as they manifest in life.  Herein I will refer to ‘reason’ as a position, analagous to rationalism, which endorses certain articulated laws of argumentation (logical, analytical) for or against a particular belief.  There is an extension of this position which maintains that aspects of human behavior are caused by a priori or acquired understanding of these rules of logic.  In the case of a priori understanding it is argued that an articulated rule of logic triggers a correspondence with a hardwired recognition feature in the individual (either on a conscious or unconscious level); in the case of acquired understanding it is argued that the articulated rule of logic forms the basis for which a person remembers how to perform a task in the future.   I contend that these conceptualizations of how reasoning occurs are fundamentally divergent from the phenomena they are meant to signify. 

What is lacking is a demonstratable verification for either belief.  I cannot on faith accept that intentionality is caused by a set of knowable hardwired or acquired rules of reason; for example, that how I am able to communicate with another person and be understood, or how I am able to open a door is causally linked to my consciously knowing a set of hardwired of learned rules of reason.  The argument that the knowledge is unconsciously acquired a priori is not alone sufficient evidence that the articulated law of reason bears an essential relationship with human cognition (one could just as much argue that the content of an openly illogical claim is in some way authenticated by some mystical unconscious correspondence) .  In the case where the articulated law of reason pertains to how people follow rules on a conscious level, I would argue that only in certain contexts is a conscious awareness of rule-playing relevant, for example in philosophical language games where we form our ideas into rational arguments susceptible to some agreed upon rules of engagement; however, in these cases the ‘rational principles’ are wholly conceptual, because by virtue of a thought experiment only certain criteria applies in the analysis, such criteria that depends on public language and articulated rational principles.  For the large part of our participation in life we do not require this rigid scaffolding of logic to get by.  

Ludwig Wittgenstein uses the anecdote about a boy told to buy five red apples. Suppose in order to perform this task the boy had to refer to an index of information in his pocket pertaining to what “five” meant, and what “red” meant, and what “apples” meant.  Is this analgous to how we know how to follow a command, do we go through an inventory in our minds, count up to five and then know what five means, or think about where red occurs in a colour wheel and then know what red means?  Insofar as we are talking about what is consciously ascertained in the moment of rule following, it appears to have less to do with abiding by some articulated system of logic, as it has to do with grasping tacitly some meaning pertaining to the situation (or ‘language-game’ in Wittgenstein’s terminology).    

I believe it is a fallacy to say that in any way beyond a ‘leap of faith’ one knows that some articulated rules of reason have a definitive causal role in our behaviour of ‘rule-following’, i.e. that reason has an essential quality.  In this case the whole ‘reason-as-essence’ position is just one more leap, self-sustained within a category of terms that describes itself tautologically.  If I am wrong then there should be a way to prove ( i.e. to know in verifiable terms) that, for example, inductive and deductive thinking occur in the human cognitive process.  What happens instead is that inductive and deductive thinking are tautologically ‘proven’ by applying the rules of inductive and deductive thinking.  Since so much of the weight of ‘reason-as-essence’ argument hinges upon the meaningfulness of these terms in describing actual cognitive processes, the contingent arguments are undermined.    

Rather than support the reason-as-essence view, and in order to alternatively explain man’s capacity for rational behaviour, I propose that  the articulated laws of reason have a causal influence over our behaviour of rule-following  insofar as they, as ‘concepts’, sway our beliefs.  Beyond these instances I would argue our behaviour of rule-following occurs indifferent to knowable articulations of intent and instead in consequence of tacit comprehension via some manner of  impulse or private sensation;  therefore, I can open the door without thinking through any sort of rules for doing so, indeed without even needing to be thinking at all of the action at hand.    What may appear to be evidence of reasoning (from an external view) may in fact be nothing more than a tacitly grasped hunch (a ‘leap’ as it were of articulated causes).  These hunches may in fact be the shadows on the cave wall reflecting some real essential qualities but by virtue of our orientation in the cave (our epistomology) we cannot adequately explain in what manner they exist distinct from our propensity for grammatical misuses of language and fanciful imagination.  To deduce or infer causal significance from the hunches is to derive interpretations which are self-perpetuating with more in common with myth-making than with demonstratable fact-discerning.        

Reason-as-essence requires a hierarchy, but under what authority can one argue for a hierarchy of hunches? 

My own belief is that the beliefs which occur most consistently have a natural advanatage over those that do not.  In a way this is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s strange biological view of the ‘Will to Power’, except my view lacks doctrinal content.  I do not even have to hold this belief, the point is the consistent beliefs sort out the hierarchy through their consistency, rather than through my imposed doctrine.  Certainly a doctrine can be held in my mind and persuade some beliefs to occur in a consistent fashion, and I am wary of this ‘fanaticism’, insofar as I can consciously dismantle belief-structures which hold to an absolute conviction. 

I welcome any thoughts on the subject, and particularly any examples of where one can prove reason-as-essence as a causal force in our behaviour of rule-following.  To reiterate, I have set up a dichotomy analogous to a hardware view (reason-as-essence) vs. a software view (reason-as-concept). I believe human intentionality bears no essential dependence on articulated rules of reason.  I argue that as far as we can show, reason exists only as concept, and has influence over our behaviour in only this matter, so that the significance of reason-based assertions are subject to this limitation, a conceptual one, not an essential one.  It is a crude analogy to then assume the concept pertains to the activity of the mind, because the concept is based solely on public language and the phenomena of cognition is based solely on private sensation: the two are not demonstrably isomorphic.

Brass Tacks

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I believe

[all reason-based interpretations of truth are fallible in that they depend upon an initial leap of faith to substantiate their claims.  Faith and reason are irreconcilable faculties of evaluation which value opposing kinds of proof to derive their conclusions.  They are irreconcilable but not equal.  Whereas faith has the potential to be self-authenticating (i.e. within the act of instantaneous conviction) reason is dependent on a logical articulation of its authority before it can be authenticated (reason by any other name is belief).  Because articulated, authentication occurs in a temporal space, there is a retroactive verification process whose gap allows one to challenge the authority of reason by applying rational inquiry to its articulated laws.]

and it is so.

Faith and Reason

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[from the old blog, 4/19/2005, dipping into the philosophy posts]

By virtue of its own nature, reason must play a limited role in acts of deliberation; used puritanically without appeal, reason as a human quality ceases to be reasonable. I find it absurd to even think of reason existing in someone’s mind somehow quarantined from everything else, as if consciously we could micro-manage the happenings of our thoughts as one does numbers in arithmetic. After all, conscious decision-making is only one aspect of mental activity, underlying it like the bulk of an iceberg submerged beneath the visible tip is the subconscious; are we to suppose that the rigor of reason is managing this area as well? If dreams are to be any indication one would think not. It goes almost without saying that reason is one of many virtues at our disposal which when counterbalanced together help to situate an agreeable equilibrium. But simply because we employ the use of reason in deliberations we should not hastily conclude that we are rational beings, and in that assume a hierarchy of virtues: that is bad reasoning! We are just as much intuitive beings, creative beings, moral beings, and none of these are the exclusive domain of reasoning (what reasoning is involved in intuition, in morality, in our aesthetic inclinations?).

I worry a lot about the allure of rationalism, because I know in the past I was highly susceptible to it. I know how the arguments go, I know the rhetoric. But I have come to learn of its incapacity to stand up to rational scrutiny, and it’s therefore self-indicting nature. Sensible adherents of rationalism now accept the provisionary authority it has on issues, but I find this concession falls on deaf ears with those who take a vested interest in the power of authority once afforded reason, to those who want clear axiomatic truths and a firm grounding to advance their own agendas; in short, irrational people.

Virtually everything I have written in this blog is an indictment of the irrational misuse of reason. Yet there is a subtle though deeply significant nuance to this indictment that still has some people questioning my sanity, and while I appreciate the concern, I assure you I am okay. This nuance is that while I am against the irrational misuse of reason (i.e. induction, scientific realism, waifism, and absolutism) I entirely endorse the faith-based misuse of reason. And what is the subtle difference between an irrational act and a faith-based act? In a word: intent. Bear with me, I am not trying to be clever, there is a huge difference between these two seemingly synonymous terms. An irrational act (as the word implies) is one whose value is determined by how rational it is, and in this case, by its noteworthy lack of this quality. Thus, scientific realism is an irrational claim because it genuinely intends to be reasonable but lacks sufficient evidence to qualify. A faith-based act does not depend on an outside source to derive its value, it is a self-authenticating act. Thus doublethink is a faith-based claim which does not need to be reasonable in order to be authenticated, but may desire to be reasonable purely for aesthetic purposes. Thus, an irrational act is failing to achieve what it intends to do, and should be discriminated against for this failing, whereas a faith-based act, insofar as it is faithful, assumes neither the intention nor responsibility to be reasonable with reason and should not be discriminated against for its misuse.

Perhaps you disagree and think that there should be a sort of fair-play between faith/reason, and that faith should not be able to misuse reason if reason cannot misuse faith. Foregoing the obvious criticism (what validates fair-play as a universal standard?) the justification for this disadvantage to reason is it is rule-based and right/wrong are determined by these rules, whereas faith is self-authenticating, and at least initially has the sovereign right to transgress all external claims of authority.

Insofar as we need to speak of thought processes abstractly (i.e. rationally) this will suffice:

1) reason-based convictions must be reasonable

2) faith-based convictions need not be reasonable

In actuality, what occurs? As the existentialists say, existence precedes essence, the individual determines value, incorporating his/her own repertoire of memories, feelings, thought fragments, which resonate in a higher level as consciousness, and on a lower level exist in a physical form as neurons firing throughout the brain. The neural activity alone will not sufficiently explain the higher level values assessed through consciousness. I defy you to conceive of an argument that is not dependent on belief, no matter how obvious it seems. A hierarchy of values is at first a belief. The superiority of reason is at first a belief. The very concept of ‘inductive reasoning’ is at first a belief; now imagine all of the subsequent beliefs that are based upon the infallibility of this first one and you begin to see the fissures of all beliefs. To the extent one is conscious of the decision-making process, we never fully realize the lineage of each thought as it happens though we may suppose such inventory in the subconscious (once again a belief). How then are we to know the infallibility of any of the rules which were accumulated through lived history? How then can we genuinely expect to know of a priori truths? By believing them, but not solely through a governing rationale, rather through sheer will, a will governed by any number of forces which supercede our conscious capacity to know.

In actuality, absolute truth can only be known via faith, and only personally. Beyond this I can only make the superficial observation that thought processes seem to consist of a vying of beliefs without fixed qualities which are continually customized to the impending variables both external and internal at any given moment. Symptomatic of such a reading is doublethink which is the Orwellian term I give to the mental event wherein two contradictory beliefs are held nearly simultaneously without conscious disturbance to either belief. The capacity for such an event supports the view of the primacy of belief which is able to accommodate paradoxes without any serious difficulty. As a technique doublethink can be consciously employed in order to concentrate will towards achieving a desired goal.